Gentry Gamble v. Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J. Wheeler : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Gentry Gamble v. Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine
J. Wheeler : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William W. Downs, JR., ESQ; Winder & Haslam; Attorneys for the Defendants/Appellees.
Frederick N. Green; Green & Berry; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gamble v. Larsen, No. 970454 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/990
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
GENTRY GAMBLE, BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Appeal NO. 970454-CA 
DANIEL R. LARSEN and Priority No. 4 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
WILLIAM W. DOWNES, JR., ESQ. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 




K F U 
50 
D 1 ^lOHGH-C* 




DANIEL R. LARSEN and 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 970454-CA 
Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
WILLIAM W. DOWNES, JR., ESQ. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii, iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 4. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 5 
C DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD PERMIT THE PRACTICE OF "OPEN 
ADOPTION", INCLUDING POSTADOPTION VISITATION BY A 
NATURAL PARENT IN A STEP-PARENT ADOPTION 10 
II. POSTADOPTION VISITATION SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
IN THIS CASE 11 
III. THE ENTIRE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO THE 
JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF COMMENCED HIS 
PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS 11 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF STATED AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR RELIEF BASED UPON FRAUD 12 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE DOCTRINE OF 
"OPEN ADOPTION", INCLUDING POSTADOPTION 
VISITATION BY A NATURAL PARENT IN A 
STEP-PARENT ADOPTION 12 
II. POSTADOPTION VISITATION SHOULD BE 
PERMITTED IN THIS CASE 19 
III. THE ENTIRE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED 
TO THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF 
COMMENCED HIS PETITION TO TERMINATE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 22 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF STATED AN INDEPENDENT 




A. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
B. Letter from Kevin Fife, dated March 8, 1995. 
C. Proposed Amended Verified Complaint. 
D. Affidavit of Gentry Gamble. 
E. Amended Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. 
F. Notice of Appeal. 
G. §8-3(a)-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
H. §78-30-1.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
I. Rule 4-902, Code of Judicial Administration. 
J. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ii. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Alvarez v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997) . . . . 1, 2, 3, 13 
Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) 3, 24 
Gribble v. Cribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978) 3, 19 
In Re Adoption of Children, etc. , 
406 A.2d 986 (N.J. 1979) 3, 18 
In Re Dana Marie E. , 429 NYS.2d 340 (N.Y. 1985) 3, 17 
In the Interest of S.A.H.r 537 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1995) . . . . 3, 13 
In the Matter of the Adoption of 
Jeremiah HallowayNavaho Nation. 
732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), F.N. 11 3, 13, 15, 16 
Michaud v. Wawruck. 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988) 3, 22 
Morse v. Daley. 704 P.2d 1087 (Nev. 1985) . . . . . . . . 3, 17 
Shaw v. Pilcherf 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959) 3, 24 
Spells v. Spells. 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1977) 3, 20 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 
811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) 3, 13 
St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982) . . 3, 24, 25, 26 
State of Utah In the Interest of J.W.F. 
Petition Of SchOOlCraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) . . 4, 20 
Sturrup v. Manhan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974) 4, 20 
Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972) 4, 20 
Statutes 
§78-2a-3(2) (h) , Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 1, 3 
§78-3 (a)-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 3, 23 
§78-30-1.5, Utah Code Ann. (1990) 3, 16 
Rule 4-902, Code of Judicial Administration 3, 23 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . 2, 3, 4, 24, 27 
iii. 
Other Authorities and References 
Federal Practice and Procedure, §2868, at 239-40 (1973) . . . 24 
Anadio and Duetsch, "Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted 
Children to 'Stay in Touch' with Blood Relatives". 
22 J. Family Law 59 (1984) 17 
"Annotation: Postadoption Visitation by Natural Parent 
"Open Adoptions"". 78 A.L.R. 4th 218 at 223 17 
L.D. Elrod and R.G. Spectort, "A Review of the Year 
in Family Law: Of Welfare Reform. Child Support 
and Relocation", at p. 775, Family Law Quarterly, 
Winter, 1997 15 
Nathan, "Visitation After Adoption: In the Best 
Interests of the Children" 17 
S. Arms, "To Love and Let Go" (1973) 16 
iv. 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
GENTRY GAMBLE, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIEL R. LARSEN and Appeal No. 970454-CA 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann, (1953 
as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Issue I: Should the Court approve the concept of 
"open adoption" including postadoption visitation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this 
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision 
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard. Alvarez 
v. Galetakaf 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
b. Issue 2: Should the trial court take evidence and 
consider whether postadoption visitation is permitted in 
this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this 
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this 
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision 
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard, Alvarez 
v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
c. Issue 3: Did the parties agree upon postadoption 
visitation and should that agreement be specifically 
enforced? 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this 
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision 
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard. Alvarez 
v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
d. Issue 4: Did the Plaintiff state a cause of action 
as an indepenent action under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to set aside the Decree of Adoption based 
upon fraud, misrepresentation and mistake? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this 
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision 
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard. Alvarez 
v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
e. Issue 5: Did the District Court lack jurisdiction 
to consider this matter in light of the Juvenile Court 
filings prior to the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss? 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this 
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision 
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard. Alvarez 
v. Galetaka. 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Statutes; 
i. §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
ii. §78-3(a)-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
iii. §78-30-1.5, Utah Code Ann. (1990). 
iv. Rule 4-902, Code of Judicial Administration. 
v. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Case Law; 
i. Alvarez v. Galetaka. 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
ii. Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
iii. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). 
iv. In Re Adoption of Childrenf etc., 406 A.2d 986 
(N.J. 1979). 
v. In Re Dana Marie E.f 429 NYS.2d 340 (N.Y. 1985) 
vi. In the Interest of S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 
1995). 
vii. In the Matter of the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway 
Navaho Nation, 732 p.2d 962 (Utah 1986), FN. 11 
viii. MJChaud y, Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988). 
ix. Morse v. Daley. 704 P.2d 1087 (Nev. 1985). 
x. Shaw V. Pilcher, 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959). 
xi. Spells y, Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1977). 
xii. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
xiii. St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
xiv. State of Utah In the Interest of J.W.F. Petition 
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of Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). 
xv. Sturrup v. Manhanf 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974). 
xvi. Workman v. Workmanf 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
The Plaintiff is the natural father of Trevor B. Wheeler-
Gamble and Baron G. Wheeler-Gamble. Mr. Gamble consented to the 
step-parent adoption of his two sons subject to conditions, 
including postadoption visitation. The parties complied with 
postadoption visitation for twenty-two (22) months until the 
children reported abuse by the Defendants. Apparently, the 
Defendants blame the Plaintiff for that report and have refused 
any visitation or contact between Mr. Gamble and the children. 
The Plaintiff's action seeks: (1) postadoption visitation; 
(2) the specific performance of the parties1 agreement for 
postadoption visitation; and, (3) in the alternative, an order 
setting aside the Decree pursuant to the Plaintiff's independent 
action under Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based upon 
fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake. 
Prior to the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
the Plaintiff commenced Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights in 
the Juvenile Court. The trial court denied the Plaintiff's 
Motion to Certify the Case to Juvenile Court and granted the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) 
essentially finding that the Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue 
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any relief after his Consent to Adoption was given and the 
adoption granted. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
every cause of action of the Plaintiff (including the Plaintiff's 
cause of action for specific performance which was sought by way 
of amendment to the Complaint. The Petitioner has pending in the 
Juvenile Court two Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights as to 
the subject children. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: 
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on June 27, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Gentry Gamble is the natural father of Trevor B. 
Wheeler-Gamble (hereinafter "Trevor"), born February 10, 1987; 
and Baron G. Wheeler- Gamble (hereinafter "Baron"), born July 24, 
1985. Amended Complaint (A.C.), p. 1, f3. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant Catherine Wheeler were 
husband and wife, which marriage was dissolved by Decree of 
Divorce in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, dated on or about April 14, 1989, 
Catherine Wheeler v» Gentry gamble, civil No. 884903729DA. A . C , 
p. 1, f4. 
3. In that Divorce Decree, Catherine Wheeler was awarded 
the permanent care, custody and control of the children, Baron 
and Trevor, subject to the reasonable rights of visitation as 
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particularly described therein in favor of Gentry Gamble, A.C., 
p. 2, f5. 
4. The Defendants married on March 1, 1991. A.C., p. 2, 
17. 
5. Due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
Plaintiff he became in arrears on child support payments. The 
arrears resulted from the failure of the Plaintiff's business and 
a coincident illness which rendered him insolvent in 1993. A.C., 
p. 2, f8. 
6. Following the Defendants' marriage, the Defendant 
Daniel R. Larsen petitioned the Court to adopt Baron and Trevor 
by way of a Petition, dated February 24, 1995. A.C., p. 2, 110. 
7. The Defendants approached Gentry Gamble to obtain his 
consent as the natural father of Baron and Trevor for their 
adoption by Defendant Daniel Larsen, and in the course of 
negotiations regarding that request, Gentry Gamble, based upon 
the written representations, promises and in consideration of the 
parties' agreement, granted his consent to the adoption and 
executed a Consent which was filed with the Court. Based upon 
the Consent, the Petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor and 
Baron was granted on or about April 27, 1995. A.C., p. 2, 111. 
8. Prior to Gentry Gamble's Consent for the adoption, the 
Defendants agreed, in writing, individually and through their 
agent, for Gentry Gamble to maintain the present visitation 
schedule with Trevor and Baron, subsequent to the adoption. See 
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letter of Kevin J. Fife, Esquire, dated March 8, 1995, marked 
Exhibit "A", Addendum. A.C., p. 3, fl2. 
9. The agreement of the parties1, furthermore, stated that 
the two minor children would be known as the surname "Wheeler-
Gamble". A.C., p. 1, f4. 
10. The postadoption visitation schedule was defined by the 
Decree of Divorce and included alternating weekend visitation, 
extended visitation as well as visitation on holidays, during the 
mid-week, and at other agreed upon times. A.C., p. 3, fl3. 
11. As part of the parties1 bargain and agreement, the 
Defendants agreed to satisfy any judgment or claim they had for 
child support arrearages. A.C., p. 3, fl4. 
12. Prior to the parties' agreement and prior to the Decree 
of Adoption based upon Plaintiff's consent, the Defendants had 
threatened Gentry Gamble with civil prosecution for failure to 
pay his child support, and criminal prosecution as well. A.C., 
p. 3 fl5. 
13. Since the granting of the Decree of Divorce, the 
parties had abided by their agreement, that is: 
i. the Defendants had provided for and allowed Gentry 
Gamble to continue to exercise the visitation schedule that 
the Defendants had adopted; 
ii. the Defendants did execute a Satisfaction of 
Judgment as to child support arrearages and claims; and, 
iii. the minor children, since the adoption, have been 
known by the name "Wheeler-Gamble". A.C., p. 4, fl6. 
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14. Prior to and since the Decree of Adoption, the 
relationship between the Plaintiff and his sons, has continued, 
and has, in fact, become more mature and meaningful. In spite of 
the Decree of Adoption, Baron and Trevor continue to look to the 
Plaintiff as their father and the emotional parent/child bond 
between them has continued and has not been altered. A.C., p. 4, 
117. 
15. Consistent with the Defendants' agreement, and their 
practice of visitation since the Decree of Adoption, the 
Plaintiff and his sons have continued to enjoy visitation, 
holidays, Father's Day, as well as numerous family celebrations 
and experiences, all of which are consistent with the Defendants' 
agreement and the parent/child bond and relationship which 
persists between the Plaintiff and the children. A.C., p. 4, fl8. 
16. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to 
inform the adoption court of their agreement with the Plaintiff 
for ongoing visitation rights with the children at the time of 
the granting of the Petition for Adoption. A.C., p. 4, ^ [19. 
17. On or about the 19th day of January, 1997, the 
Defendants arbitrarily, without just cause, and contrary to the 
acknowledged best interest of Trevor and Baron, unilaterally 
terminated the Plaintiff's visitation with those children. A.C., 
p. 4, 520. 
18. The children have been forbidden to see or communicate 
with the Plaintiff. A.C., p. 5, f21. 
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19. The children have been instructed by the Defendants to 
ignore the Plaintiff and have been threatened with discipline in 
the event that they disobey the Defendants in this regard. A.C, 
p. 5, 523. 
20. In spite of the informal efforts of the Plaintiff to 
continue to visit with the children as the parties agreed and 
have allowed for nearly two years since the adoption, the 
Defendants have refused. A.C, p. 5, f24. 
21. As a result of the Defendants' actions, the children 
have been denied the ongoing comfort, counsel and benefits of 
their relationship with their father. A.C, p. 5, f25. 
22. At the time the Plaintiff executed his Consent the 
Defendants represented to him that he would continue to maintain 
the present visitation schedule with his sons. The Plaintiff 
relied upon that representation at the time he executed the 
Consent to adoption. The Defendants' representation was critical 
to the Plaintiff. The Defendants knew full well, at that time, 
that they had no intention of granting the Plaintiff visitation 
rights and would, at the slightest provocation, unilaterally 
assert their technical rights under the Decree of Adoption to 
deny the Plaintiff any further visitation or any contact 
whatsoever with the children. Had the Plaintiff known the truth 
of the Defendants' representation (that they maintained the right 
to unilaterally terminate the visitation privileges of the 
Plaintiff), he would never had executed the Consent, nor 
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permitted the adoption to proceed without his objection. A.C., 
P. 6, f29. 
23. The Defendants induced the Plaintiff to give his 
consent to the adoption of his sons based upon the foregoing 
promises which are contrary to the representations made to the 
adoption court, which were relied upon by the court, for the 
granting of the Decree of Adoption. A.C., p. 7, f31. 
24. The Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss his cause of action 
for termination of parental rights set forth in the District 
Court Complaint. Prior to dismissal of the District Court action 
by the Judge, the Plaintiff had commenced a Petition for 
Termination of Parental Rights in the Third District Juvenile 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, In Re Interest of Trevor B. 
Wheeler-Gamble and Baron G. Wheeler-Gambler Case Nos. 933163 and 
933164. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD PERMIT THE PRACTICE OF "OPEN 
ADOPTION". INCLUDING POSTADOPTION VISITATION BY A 
NATURAL PARENT IN A STEP-PARENT ADOPTION. 
The trend is to approve the concept of open adoption. Open 
adoption has been approved in other states even where there is no 
specific statutory allowance for the concept. Open adoption has 
been tacitly approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Open adoption 
is practised throughout the state as a practical matter. 
Open adoption is based upon the best interests of the 
children, not "parental rights". Open adoption may be based upon 
the agreement of the parties, or an independent finding of the 
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best interests of the children. In any case, it is dependent 
upon the best interests of the children. 
II. POSTADOPTION VISITATION SHOPLP BE PERMITTED IN 
THIS CASE, 
The trial court determined that the Plaintiff had no 
standing to pursue postadoption visitation. The court concluded 
that the Consent and the Adoption Decree terminated all parental 
rights. However, the parties had agreed on postadoption 
visitation. The expectation of postadoption visitation was a 
condition of the Plaintiff's consent. The visitation actually 
took place for twenty-two (22) months until it was arbitrarily 
terminated by the Defendants. The children have and continue to 
enjoy a parental bond with the Plaintiff. The visitation has 
been in their best interests and the abrupt termination of 
visitation is contrary to the children's best interests. 
If the court approves of the concept of "open adoption", the 
Plaintiff should enjoy postadoption visitation in this case. 
Consistent with the best interests of the children, the case 
should be remanded for those factual determinations. 
III. THE ENTIRE CASE SHOPLP HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO THE 
JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF COMMENCED HIS 
PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS, 
Once the Plaintiff had commenced Petitions to Terminate 
Parental Rights in the Juvenile Court, this matter should have 
been referred to the Juvenile Court for determination. 
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IV. THE PLAINTIFF STATED AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR RELIEF BASED UPON FRAUD, 
Inasmuch as the Defendants did not divulge to the court the 
existence of their agreement for postadoption visitation, and the 
other conditions or inducements associated with the Plaintiff's 
consent, there is "fraud upon the court". Additionally, the 
Plaintiff relied upon the representations of the Defendants to 
the effect that he would enjoy a right to postadoption 
visitation. All along the Defendants intended that they would 
have the discretion to interrupt postadoption visitation and 
contact in their discretion. Had the Plaintiff known of that 
intention, he would have never given his consent. The 
independent action under Rule 60(b) should go forward. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT 8BQULP PERMIT THE PRACTICE OF 
"OPEN ADOPTION". INCLUDING POSTADOPTION 
VISITATION BY A NATURAL PARENT IN A STEP-
PARENT ADOPTION, 
The trial court granted the Defendants1 Rule 12(b)(6) Motion 
to Dismiss. The Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint seeks an 
order continuing the parties1 practice of postadoption 
visitation, among other things.1 
1
 At the hearing on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, the court 
considered the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint to state 
a cause of action for specific performance and breach of 
contract. However, the court concluded that the new cause of 
action should also be dismissed. The Amended Complaint also 
eliminated the Plaintiff's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 
The Plaintiff filed a Petition as to both children, separately, 
in the Third District Juvenile Court prior to a hearing on 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
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In so doing, the court relied upon the Decree of Adoption 
signed by the District Judge and stated, "In light of Judge 
Frederick's termination of parental rights with these children, 
Plaintiff lacks standing to seek or enforce visitation rights 
after the Decree of Adoption became final on April 27, 1995." 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, f7, Conclusions 
of Law.) 
"When reviewing a trial court's grant of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 'we accept 
the factual allegations in the Complaint as 
true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff. 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a question of law, we give the 
trial court's ruling no deference and review 
it under a correctness standard.'" Alvarez 
Vt GaletaRa, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997), 
quoting stt Benedict's Devi Cof v, Stt 
Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 
1991). 
The effect and reasoning of the trial court's decision would 
bar the possibility of an open adoption. 
". . .A fundamental concept of an open 
adoption is to allow some communication 
between adoptive and natural parents, and 
when appropriate, to permit communication 
between the natural parent and the child as 
the child grows up. . ." In the Matter of 
the AdoptiQn of Jeremiah HallQway, NavahQ 
Nation, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), F.N. 11. 
This concept includes the potential for postadoption 
visitation by the parent who consents to the adoption. In the 
Interest of S.A.H.. 537 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1995). 
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The Court's conclusion in this case was that under no 
circumstances could the Court permit an open adoption and 
postadoption visitation when a standard consent has been signed 
by the natural parent and an adoption decree entered. This is in 
spite of the following facts and inferences which are supported 
by the record: 
i. The Plaintiff's Consent for Adoption was 
conditioned upon the promise of continuing visitation with 
his two sons; 
ii. The children's best interests would be served by 
continued visitation; 
iii. Subsequent to the adoption, visitation continued 
as agreed for some twenty-two (22) months; 
iv. The minor children have maintained their 
parent/child relationship and bond with the Plaintiff since 
the adoption. 
v. The children have continued to interact with the 
Plaintiff as their father by engaging in traditional 
Father's Day visits and activities, for instance. 
vi. The Defendants breached their agreement with the 
Plaintiff when they unilaterally, and without cause, 
terminated any contact whatsoever between the Plaintiff and 
the children (coincident with the children's reporting of 
abuse to their school principal). 
vii. The Plaintiff relied upon the representations of 
the Defendants regarding postadoption contact and 
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visitation, and had he known the truth of the Defendant's 
intentions (to terminate visitation and contact at their 
will), the Plaintiff would never have consented to the 
adoption. 
viii. The Judge who granted the adoption was unaware of 
the parties' agreement and the inducements associated with 
the Plaintiff's consent. 
In appropriate cases, the trend is to approve open 
adoptions. 
"Three trends appear in the adoption area -
moves toward earlier termination of parental 
rights so that children can be adopted, a 
willingness to allow non-married partners to 
adopt their partner's child, and an increased 
willingness by court's to consider open 
adoptions." L.D. Elrod and R.G. Spector, A 
Review of the Year in Family Law; of welfare 
Reformf Child Support and Relocation, at p. 
775, Family Law Quarterly, Winter, 1997. 
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has shown an inclination to 
look favorably upon the concept of open adoption. In the case of 
In the Matter of the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway, Navaho 
Nation, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), the court considered whether 
Utah Courts had jurisdiction over a full blooded Navaho enrolled 
in the Navaho tribe. The court concluded that the Utah State 
courts did not have jurisdiction. This called for the return of 
the child to his mother. The court was obviously concerned about 
the relationship of the child and the prospective adoptive 
parents. The child had lived with the prospective adoptive 
parents for several years prior to the intervention of the Navaho 
Nation in the adoption proceedings. 
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In that case, the court cited, with approval, the concept of 
"open adoption". The court could not enforce open adoption 
because Utah courts lacked jurisdiction in that matter. Justice 
Zimmerman stated: 
"11. An innovative approach to adoption, 
called an open adoption, is gaining increased 
recognition among professionals in the 
adoption field and may be suited to this 
case. A fundamental concept of an open 
adoption is to allow some communication 
between adoptive and natural parents and, 
when appropriate, to permit communication 
between the natural parent and the child as 
the child grows up. See generally S. Arms To 
Love and Let QQ (1973). This approach 
presents some creative possibilities in the 
instant case: an arrangement might be reached 
which would allow Jeremiah to remain with his 
adoptive parents but also would permit the 
tribe to teach the child about his Indian 
heritage. We make this statement as an 
observation only. Recognizing that the 
matter is not ours to decide." 
The best interests of the child is always the overriding 
concern in an adoption case. This principle has been adopted by 
statute in Utah: 
"Legislative Intent. It is the intent and 
desire of the legislature that in every 
adoption the best interest of the child 
should govern and be of foremost concern in 
the court's determination." § 78-30-1.5, Utah 
Code Ann- (1990). 
Consistent with that goal, courts have found that open 
adoption is appropriate in some cases, though not in all cases. 
"The practice of permitting postadoption 
visitation by the natural parents of adopted 
children may benefit certain children by 
protecting them from the psychological harm 
that may result from the complete severance 
of the former family ties, and by allowing 
adoptions to take place when natural parents 
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are unwilling to lose all contact with their 
children, but would otherwise favor the 
adoption." Annotation: Postadoption 
Visitation by Natural Parent "Open 
adoptions"r 78 A.L.R. 4th 218 at 223. 
See also, Anadio and Deutsch. Open adoption: Allowing 
Adopted Children to 'Stay in Touch1 with Blood Relatives, 22 J. 
Family Law 59 (1984) and Nathan, "Visitation After Adoption: In 
the Best Interests of the Children", 59 NYU L. R. 633 (June 
1984). 
Additionally, courts which have allowed open adoption 
without the benefit of statutes which specifically allow 
postadoption contact: 
"Without expressly addressing the issue of 
postadoption visitation, adoption statutes 
generally establish a vehicle for terminating 
the legal relationship between the natural 
parents and their children, and for giving 
the adoptive parents full custody rights of 
the same nature and scope of those of a 
natural parent. . . Thus, courts deciding 
whether to permit postadoption visitation by 
a natural parent must frequently reach a 
decision without the benefit of explicit 
statutory guidance." Annotation; Open 
Adoptions, supra at 224. 
Therefore, Courts have approved the concept of open adoption 
and postadoption visitation for a natural parent when it will 
promote the best interests of the adopted child. Morse v. Daley, 
704 p.2d 1087 (Nev. 1985), and Re Adoption of Children, etc, 406 
A.2d 986 (N.J. 1979) (here the New Jersey court allowed 
visitation by the natural father where the natural father had 
enjoyed a viable relationship with the adopted children) and In 
Re Dana Marie E.r 429 NYS.2d 340 (N.Y. 1985) (where the court 
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followed the view that a child's best interest may require an 
order granting postadoption visitation to a natural parent and 
her twelve year old daughter. In part, the court relied upon 
legal commentary concluding that continued postadoption contact 
with the natural parent would, in certain circumstances, help a 
child to become better adjusted emotionally.) 
Other jurisdictions have approved postadoption visitation 
where the consent for adoption was conditioned upon such right, 
in in Re Adoption of Children, etc, supra, the court held that 
it was proper to allow postadoption visitation by a natural 
father where his consent to the adoption was on the condition 
that the court would preserve the independent enforceable right 
of the daughters1 at their sole and exclusive option, to visit 
him, and concluded that such an arrangement was in their best 
interest. In so doing, the New Jersey court recognized the fact 
that many adult adoptees have a psychological need to know the 
facts concerning their parentage and concluded that a certain 
similar psychological need must be recognized where a child 
already knows and have a viable relationship with a natural 
parent who consents to a step-parent's adoption. 
Generally, in determining whether or not an open adoption 
should be allowed together with postadoption visitation, courts 
have looked to the following considerations: 
i. the nature of the relationship between the natural 
parent and the adopted children; 
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ii whether there was an agreement for postadoption 
visitation; 
iii. whether the adopted child would be harmed by a 
total severance of the relationship with the natural parent; 
iv. whether the consent for adoption was conditional; 
v. whether the adoption is a step-parent adoption; 
vi. any facts which would weigh against postadoption 
visitation and contact; and, 
vii. generally, whether the postadoption visitation and 
contact would be in the best interests of the child or 
children. 
All of the above considerations are fact sensitive. They 
call upon the finder of fact to exercise discretion and wisdom. 
Where the facts would suggest that an open adoption is favorable, 
a motion to dismiss should be denied. 
POINT II. 
POSTADOPTION VISITATION SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
IN THIS CASE, 
In granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the trial 
court found that the Plaintiff had no standing. Presumably this 
is due to the legal effect of the Plaintiff's consent for 
adoption and the Decree of Adoption. However, Utah has permitted 
visitation between children and third parties where those third 
parties have no "legal" right to such a privilege. Visitation 
rights have been permitted when the best interests of the 
children had been served. In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1978), the Utah court permitted step-father visitation in 
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the absence of an adoption by the step-father, where the 
visitation would serve the best interests of the child• See 
also, Workman v. Workman. 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972); Sturrup v. 
Manhan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974), and Spells v. Spells, 378 
A.2d 879 (Pa. 1977). 
In State of Utah In the Interest of J.W.F. Petition of 
Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), the Utah court held that a 
step-parent (whether or not they stood "in local parentis"), was 
to be treated as a relative and entitled to a hearing as to 
whether it is in the child's best interest to be awarded custody 
or visitation rights. The court reasoned: 
"We conclude that several factors may justify 
granting a person standing to petition for 
custody of a child. As the court of appeals 
noted, the legally enforceable financial 
obligations that a person had toward a child 
may suffice to give that person standing to 
seek custody. However, the grant of standing 
cannot be determined solely by reference to 
legal support obligations. Equally important 
is the person's status or relationship to the 
child even if the person has no legal duty of 
support to a child, that person's legal 
relationship to the child may suffice for 
standing. Examples include close relatives, 
who, although lacking a duty of support, may 
be perceived by reason of that relationship 
to have the child's best interests at heart. 
Such a relationship would seem to warrant a 
grant of standing. (Footnote 4) 
(Footnote 4) In addition, it is conceivable 
that persons who are not related by blood or 
marriage, although not presumptively entitled 
to standing, could show that had a 
relationship with the child that would 
warrant a grant of standing. We have no such 
situation before us today." In Re J.W.F, 
supra. 
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More recently, a natural mother's girlfriend has been 
awarded visitation rights, and the natural mother's Motion to 
Dismiss that action for lack of standing was denied in the case 
of A.I, v. CD.
 r Case No. 940902124, decided by Judge Leslie A. 
Lewis, Third District Court, State of Utah. While the case is 
not binding authority on this court, it is consistent with a 
practice which is not at all unusual in Utah courts, and 
particularly Juvenile courts, to acknowledge and permit 
visitation by third parties, including grandparents, where 
adoption takes place following the termination of parental rights 
or the death of natural parents. See: In the Matter of AA 
Berlin, Case No. 943900233 in the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah (where grandmother 
was permitted ongoing contact and standard visitation rights as 
part of the adoption decree where a child's aunt adopted 
following the death of the natural mother). 
In this case, the considerations set forth above suggest 
that ongoing visitation by the Plaintiff should be permitted. 
Mr. Gamble did not consent to the adoption of his sons because of 
a deteriorated or destroyed parent/child relationship. Rather, 
the relationship is sound and has continued as an appropriate 
parent/child relationship even after the adoption. By all 
indications, the continued relationship between the children and 
Mr. Gamble would be beneficial to them. In fact, there is no 
suggestion on the record to the contrary. 
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Mr. Gamble's consent was conditional and based upon the 
written promise of ongoing visitation. Had it not been for that 
promise, Mr. Gamble would not have consented to the adoption. In 
similar cases, other courts have specifically enforced such an 
agreement. See Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988). 
In the Michaud case, the court enforced an open adoption and 
visitation agreement between the natural mother and the adoptive 
parents so long as the child's best interests were the 
determinative criteria. In that case the natural mother had 
consented to the adoption and was allowed to specifically perform 
the agreement requiring postadoption visitation. The court 
specifically rejected the contention that the enforcement of the 
agreement would somehow violate the state's adoption statutes. 
Consistent with the parties' agreement, Mr. Gamble was 
permitted visitation for twenty-two (22) months following the 
adoption. In contract terms, such behavior would constitute part 
performance of the parties' contract. It certainly created a 
reasonable expectation on the part of the children for ongoing 
contact with the person they still view as their natural father. 
POINT III. 
THE ENTIRE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO 
THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF 
COMMENCED HIS PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL 
RISHT&L 
The Complaint originally stated a cause of action for 
termination of parental rights based upon the abuse and neglect 
of the subject children. This cause of action was in addition to 
the Plaintiff's claim for postadoption visitation, to set aside 
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the Decree, and for the specific performance of the parties1 
visitation contract. The Defendants moved to dismiss the 
termination cause of action. The Plaintiff agreed to dismiss 
that cause of action and moved to amend the Complaint to state 
the cause of action for specific performance. 
The Plaintiff then filed two Petitions to Terminate Parental 
Rights as to each of the subject children. See Addendum F, the 
"Amended Petition for Termination of Parental Rights", Gentry 
Gamble, Petitioner, Case Nos. 933163 and 933164.2 
Rule 4-902, Code of Judicial Administration, states as 
follows: 
"(1) In district coutt cases where there is a 
question concerning the support, custody or 
visitation of a child and a petition 
concerning abuse, dependency or neglect of 
the same child has been filed in juvenile 
court, the district court shall certify the 
question of support, custody or visitation to 
the juvenile court for determination. 
(4) When the district court certifies 
questions of support, custody or visitation, 
the clerk of the district court shall 
transmit the entire case file to the clerk of 
the juvenile court who shall refer to the 
presiding judge for assignment." 
Furthermore, §78-3(a)-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
also requires the certification of such cases to Juvenile Court 
in addition to granting the District Court discretion to certify 
such cases "at any time" whether an action is pending in the 
Juvenile Court or not. 
2




THE PLAINTIFF STATED AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR RELIEF BASED UPON FRAUD, 
The Plaintiff brought his action pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
Utah Rules Qf Civil Procedure as an independent action seeking to 
set aside the Decree of Divorce. The Defendants moved to dismiss 
this action claiming that it was not timely, or that it was not 
within the three month provision of Rule 60(b). However, there 
is no three month time limit on an independent action pursuant to 
Rule 60(b). See St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
Rule 60(b), in relevant parts, states as follows: 
"This Rule does not limit the power of the 
court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules, or by an 
independent action." 
An independent action is the proper way to attack an 
adoption decree which is allegedly procured based upon fraud. 
Shaw v. Pilcher. 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959). Additionally, 
fraud, accident and mistake are grounds for relief by way of 
independent action. The Utah Supreme Court, in Gillmore v. 
Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993), elaborated on the holding in 
St. Pierre v. Edmonds, supra, and stated: 
"This case [St. Pierre] did not state that an 
independent action will only lie for such 
claims or that such an action is no longer 
viable to remedy errors based on mutual 
mistakes of fact in legal descriptions. 
Moreover, we cited 11 Charles A. Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure. §2868, at 239-40 (1973) which 
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specifically states that an independent 
action in equity, also will lie on the basis 
of accident or of mistake." 
The St, Pierre case is particularly instructive. That case 
involved allegations of "fraud upon the court" which were based 
upon claims that the plaintiff had assented to a settlement 
agreement as a result of harassment, threats, abuse, and 
intimidation by her ex-husband. 
In this case, the Plaintiff asserts that the consent for 
adoption was based upon: (1) the contract and promise for 
continued visitation rights; (2) because the Defendants had 
threatened legal proceedings and criminal proceedings because of 
the Plaintiff's failure to pay child support due to circumstances 
beyond his control; and, (3) the inducement to forgive child 
support arrearages. In essence, the Defendants took advantage of 
the Plaintiff's dire financial straights and emotional ill 
health. 
The letter from Mr. Larsen's attorney referencing the 
agreement for ongoing visitation was never divulged to the Court. 
Had the agreement been divulged to Judge Frederick, the adoption 
would never have been granted. Whether that information was 
divulged to Judge Frederick was beyond the Plaintiff's control. 
Only the Defendants decided what evidence they would give the 
Judge in order to obtain the adoption. The fact that the natural 
father, who purportedly consented to the adoption, would continue 
to enjoy parental rights was a pivotal fact. Additionally the 
fact that the Plaintiff had been induced to give his consent by 
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virtue of the promise for ongoing visitation, and the 
satisfaction of child support arrearages, would have been 
relevant factors for the Court to consider in the adoption 
proceeding. The Plaintiff's Complaint states a cause of action 
under St. Pierre, The Defendants clearly withheld information 
and thereby perpetrated a fraud upon the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Open adoption should be approved by this Court. As part of 
an open adoption, under proper circumstances and when it is in 
the best interests of the child, postadoption visitation should 
be permitted. Unless there is a statute expressly barring such 
an award, it has been held permissible in other jurisdictions. 
Consenting to an adoption should not, necessarily, result in a 
termination of any contact between the natural parent and the 
adopted child. The adoption may effectively terminate parental 
rights, but postadoption visitation derives from the child's best 
interests rather than parental rights. 
In this case, the parties agreed to postadoption visitation 
which continued for twenty-two (22) months after the adoption. 
Visitation and contact were terminated unilaterally by the 
Defendants without consideration of the children's best 
interests. The children's best interests should be a factual 
question resolved by the trial court. 
The Plaintiff has stated an independent cause of action to 
set aside the adoption decree based upon fraud. Contrary to the 
representations contained in the consent and decree, the parties 
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had, in fact, agreed upon postadoption visitation. Additionally, 
the consent was procured based upon misrepresentation of the 
Plaintiff's postadoption visitation and induced by promises which 
were not divulged to the court. 
In response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the 
Plaintiff commenced a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights in 
the Juvenile Court. This case should have been certified to the 
Juvenile Court for determination. 
The matter should be remanded to the Juvenile Court to take 
evidence and make findings of fact in regards to the best 
interests of the children and whether or not postadoption 
visitation should continue. Additionally, the Plaintiff should 
be entitled to pursue his claim to set aside the Decree under his 
Rule 60(b) independent action. 
DATED THIS X \ day of October, 1997. 
GREEN & BERRY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the day of 
October, 1997, I served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellant 
upon William W. Downes, Jr., Esq., Winder & Haslam, the counsel 
for Defendant/Appellee in this matter by mailing a copy by first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 




torney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




DANIEL R. LARSEN and 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 970901796 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The above-captioned matter came before the court on the 
9th day of May, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, plain-
tiff appearing in person and through counsel, Frederick N. 
Green, and defendants appearing in person and through counsel, 
William W. Downes, Jr. The court reviewed plaintiff's Com-
plaint, the Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to 
Children Conceived Within Marriage and the Decree of Adoption. 
Based thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby 
enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 24, 1995, Daniel R. Larsen filed a 
Petition in the Third Judicial District Court to adopt Trevor 
Wheeler Gamble and Baron Wheeler Gamble, the natural children 
of his spouse, Catherine J. Wheeler. In the Matter of the 
Adoption of Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and Baron G. Wheeler 
Gamble, Third District Court Case No. 952900102AD (Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick). 
2. On March 20, 1995, Gentry Gamble, the childrens1 
natural father, signed the Certified Consent of Father Giving 
up Rights to Children Conceived Within Marriage and Waiver of 
Notice, 
3. The Certified Consent provides a warning at the top 
of the document as follows: 
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT 
WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY 
SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS 
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR 
CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT. 
4. Paragraph 7 of the Certified Consent provides: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final 
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah eode 
Ann. Section 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be 
released from all future parental duties toward and 
all future responsibilities for the adopted children, 
and have no further rights with regard to the chil-
dren. 
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5. Paragraph 8 of the Certified Consent of Father 
provides: 
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final 
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the 
children will be adopted by the petitioner and the 
children shall be regarded and treated in all 
respects as the children of the petitioner and 
Catherine Wheeler. 
6. Paragraph 10 of the Certified Consent of Father 
provides: 
[Plaintiff] has had the opportunity to consult with 
and obtain the advice of an attorney of his choice. 
7. The Decree of Adoption entered on April 27, 1995 by 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick provides, at paragraph 4: 
"All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to 
Trevor and Baron are hereby and forever terminated." 
8. Plaintiff's Complaint references a letter from the 
law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal to plaintiff wherein 
plaintiff was advised: "You may maintain the present visita-
tion schedule with Trevor and Baron." 
9. The Complaint does not reference, nor did plaintiff 
present at oral argument, any other documents to further 
establish or define any ongoing visitation agreement between 
the parties. 
10. Plaintiff sought leave of court to file an Amended 
Verified Complaint alleging an additional cause of action 
styled as "Specific Performance and Breach of Contract." 
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Plaintiff alleges the existence of contractual visitation 
rights that have been breached by the defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
hereby makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under principles of contract law, the language of the 
Certified Consent and the Decree of Adoption is clear and 
unequivocal. Plaintiff Gentry Gamble understood and agreed to 
relinquish all rights to the adopted children. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Adoption granted on April 
27, 1995, all rights and interests of plaintiff with regard to 
these children were forever terminated. 
3. When read in conjunction with the clear and unequivo-
cal language of the Certified Consent and Decree of Adoption, 
the referenced letter does not create in plaintiff any legally 
enforceable right with regard to the adopted children. 
4. The visitation language in the attorneyfs letter is 
insufficient in light of the adoption papers to create a 
contract for post-adoption visitation. The attorney's letter 
does not define the visitation schedule, explain how the 
visitation schedule could be modified, provide an enforcement 
mechanism or preclude the defendants from terminating the 
visitation schedule. 
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5. As the natural parents of these children pursuant to 
the Decree of Adoption, defendants may terminate any contact 
between their children and plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action seeking to set 
aside the Decree of Adoption pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure should be dismissed with prejudice for 
failing to state a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted. 
7. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action seeking to enforce 
or establish visitation with defendants1 children should be 
dismissed with prejudice. In light of Judge Frederick's 
termination of plaintiff's parental rights with these children, 
plaintiff lacks standing to seek or enforce visitation rights 
after the Decree of Adoption became final on April 27, 1995. 
8. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action seeking to termi-
nate defendants' parental rights pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-3(a)-401, et. seq., should be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile courts of this state 
have exclusive original jurisdiction over such actions. 
9. Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint should be 
denied as futile since the Amended Complaint likewise fails to 




Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is denied, 
3. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
GREEN & BERRY 
Tderick N. Green 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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March 8, 1995 
Gentry Gamble 
4700 South 900 East, Suite 30-146 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: Adoption of Trevor and Baron 
Dear Mr. Gamble: 
Catherine has informed me that you have agreed to voluntarily consent to Dan's adoption 
of Baron and Trevor. In accordance with your agreement, I have prepared and filed Dan 
Larsen's Petition for Adoption. Under Utah law, this Petition must be served upon you or you 
must agreed to accept service. It is my understanding that you have agreed to accept service and 
I have prepared am Acceptance of Service for your signature. 
Enclosed you will find a copy of the Petition for Adoption, a Notice of Petition of 
Adoption and your Consent to Adoption. The Consent is the document you will sign to agree 
to Dan's adoption of Trevor and Baron. I will make arrangements for you to sign this document 
and the Acceptance of Service in front of a notary public and that notary public will return these 
documents to me. I will be sending you further correspondence and calling you on the telephone 
regarding this procedure, which will be handled in a confidential manner. In the interim, you 
should review the Consent and take it to an attorney for his or her review if you so desire. 
Once the Consent is signed, it is irrevocable. 
When the adoption has become final, I will file a satisfaction of judgment regarding the 
Order on Order to Show Cause previously entered against you. In addition, if any negative 
credit history appears because of this judgment, we will arrange for that to be removed from 
your credit report. It is my understanding that Trevor and Baron are to retain the surname 
Wheeler Gamble during the period of their minority. Also, you may maintain the present 
visitation schedule with Trevor and Baron. Finally, once your parental rights are terminated, 
you are under no continuing obligation to provide any support for Trevor and Baron. 
Gentry Gamble 
March 8, 1995 
Page 2 
I appreciate your willingness to work with Catherine and me on this matter. If you have 
any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to call me. I will be contacting you shortly 
to make arrangements for the signing of your Consent and Acceptance of Service. 
Very truly yours, 




cc: Catherine Wheeler 
TabC 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building, 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




Civil NO. 970901796 
DANIEL R. LARSEN AND 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant, 
The Plaintiff complains of the Defendants, and each of them, 
and alleges in support thereof as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
2. The Defendants are husband and wife and are each 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Gentry Gamble is the natural father of Trevor B. 
Wheeler Gamble (hereinafter "Trevor"), born February 10, 1987; 
and Baron G. Wheeler Gamble (hereinafter "Baron"), born July 24, 
1985. 
4. The Plaintiff and Defendant Catherine Wheeler were 
husband and wife, which marriage was divorced by Decree of this 
Court, dated on or about April 14, 1989, Catherine Wheeler v. 
Gentry Gamble, Civil No. 884903729DA. See Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. In that Divorce Decree, Catherine Wheeler was awarded 
the permanent care, custody and control of the children, Baron 
and Trevor, subject to the reasonable rights of visitation as 
particularly described therein in favor of Gentry Gamble. 
6. The Plaintiff herein was ordered to pay $200.00 per 
month, per child as and for child support. 
7. The Defendants married on March 1, 1991. 
8. Due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
Plaintiff herein, he became in arrears on child support payments. 
The arrears resulted from the failure of the Plaintiff's business 
and a coincident illness which rendered him insolvent in 1993. 
9. In spite of this, and at all times since the granting 
of the Decree of Divorce, Gentry Gamble has maintained a close 
relationship with Baron and Trevor and has maintained a parental 
relationship with the two children, making payments in 1994 of 
$400.00 in child support plus $100.00. 
10. Following the Defendants1 marriage, the Defendant 
Daniel R. Larsen petitioned the Court to adopt Baron and Trevor 
by way of a Petition, dated February 24, 1995. 
11. The Defendants approached Gentry Gamble to obtain his 
consent as the natural father of Baron and Trevor for their 
adoption by Defendant Daniel Larsen, and in the course of 
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negotiations regarding that request, Gentry Gamble, based upon 
the representations, promises and in consideration of the 
parties' agreement, granted his consent to the adoption and 
executed a Consent which was filed with the court. Based upon 
the Consent, the Petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor and 
Baron was granted on or about April 27, 1995. See Decree of 
Adoption, marked Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
12. Prior to Gentry Gamble's Consent for the adoption, the 
Defendants agreed, in writing, individually and through their 
agent, for Gentry Gamble to maintain the present visitation 
schedule with Trevor and Baron, subsequent to the adoption. See 
letter of Kevin J. Fife, dated March 8, 1995, marked Exhibit "C" 
and attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
13. The present visitation schedule was roughly defined by 
the Decree of Divorce and included alternating weekend 
visitation, extended visitation as well as visitation on 
holidays, during the mid-week, and at other agreed upon times. 
14. Furthermore, as part of the parties' bargain and 
agreement, the Defendants agreed to satisfy any judgment or claim 
they had for child support arrearages. 
15. Prior to the parties' agreement and prior to the Decree 
of Adoption based upon Plaintiff's consent, the Defendant's had 
threatened Gentry Gamble with not only civil prosecution for 
failure to pay his child support, but criminal liability and 
prosecution as well. 
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16. Since the granting of the Decree of Divorce, the 
parties had abided by their agreement, that is: 
(a) the Defendants did execute a Satisfaction of 
Judgment as to child support arrearages and claims; and, 
(b) the Defendants have provided for and allowed 
Gentry Gamble to continue to exercise the visitation 
schedule that the Defendants had adopted. 
17. Prior to and since the Decree of Adoption, the 
relationship between Gentry Gamble and his sons, has continued, 
and has, in fact, become more mature and meaningful. In spite of 
the Decree of Adoption, Baron and Trevor continue to look to 
Gentry as their father and the emotional parent/child bond 
between them has continued and has not been altered. 
18. Consistent with the Defendants' agreement, and their 
practice of visitation since the Decree of Adoption, the 
Plaintiff and his sons have continued to enjoy visitation, 
holidays, Father's Day, as well as numerous family celebrations 
and experiences, all of which are consistent with the Defendants1 
agreement and the parent/child bond and relationship which 
persists between the Plaintiff and the children. 
19. On information and belief, the Plaintiff alleges that 
the Defendants have failed to inform the court of their agreement 
with the Plaintiff for ongoing visitation rights with the 
children at the time of the granting of the Petition for 
Adoption. 
20. On or about the 19th day of January, 1997, the 
Defendants arbitrarily, without just cause, and contrary to the 
4 
acknowledged best interest of Trevor and Baron, unilaterally 
terminated the Plaintiff's visitation rights with those children. 
21. The children have been forbidden to see the Plaintiff, 
22. Except for the children's chaperoned visit at the time 
of the funeral of the Plaintiff's "step-son" there has been no 
interaction permitted by Defendants by way of personal visits, 
telephone conversations and the like. 
23. The children have been instructed by the Defendants to 
ignore the Plaintiff and have been threatened with discipline in 
the event that they disobey the Defendants in this regard. 
24. In spite of the informal efforts of the Plaintiff to 
continue to visit with the children as the parties agreed and 
have allowed for nearly two years since the adoption, the 
Defendants, and each of them, have refused. 
25. As a result of the Defendants' actions, the children 
have been denied the ongoing comfort, counsel and benefits of 
their relationship with their father. 
26. The actions of the Defendants are contrary to the best 
interests of the children, and have been undertaken without the 
benefit of the Defendants' agreement or consulting with the 
Plaintiff, much less any court direction or order. 
27. Unless the Court grants relief to the Plaintiff as 
prayed herein, the Defendant will continue in this course of 
action to the damage of the children, as well as the Plaintiff's 
rights. 
28. The Defendants have threatened the Plaintiff with legal 
proceedings to restrain him from any further contact with the 
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children, or the children with the Plaintiff. However, the 
Plaintiff is unaware of any action commenced by the Defendants in 
this regard which would in any sense legitimize their unilateral 
behavior. 
29. At the time the Plaintiff executed his Consent the 
Defendants represented to him that he would continue to maintain 
the present visitation schedule with his sons. The Plaintiff 
relied upon that representation at the time he executed the 
Consent to adoption. The Defendants1 representation was critical 
to the Plaintiff. The Defendants knew full well, at that time, 
that they had no intention of granting the Plaintiff visitation 
rights and would, at the slightest provocation, unilaterally 
assert their technical rights under the Decree of Adoption to 
deny the Plaintiff any further visitation or any contact 
whatsoever with the children. Had the Plaintiff known the truth 
of the Defendants1 representation (that they maintained the right 
to unilaterally terminate the visitation privileges of the 
Plaintiff), he would never had executed the Consent, nor 
permitted the adoption to proceed without his objection. By 
virtue of the foregoing, the Defendants have acted fraudulently. 
30. By failing to inform the Court of the parties' 
agreement, the Defendants have committed a fraud upon the Court 
and obtained a Decree of Adoption without apprising the court of 
all of the relevant circumstances. 
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31. In fact, the Defendants have induced the Plaintiff to 
give his consent to the adoption of his sons based upon the 
foregoing promises which are contrary to the representations made 
to the Court, which were relied upon by the Court, for the 
granting of the Decree of Adoption. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
32. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this 
reference as if fully set forth herein all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 30. 
33. The Defendants action is fraudulent, both as to the 
procurement of the Plaintiff's consent as well as the adoption 
itself. 
34. As such, the Court should rescind and set aside the 
Decree of Adoption referred to above pursuant to Rule 60(b) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the common law of this 
state. 
35. The Court's order rescinding the Decree of Adoption 
should restore the Plaintiff to his full parental rights as well 
as his parental obligations, which he is willing, able and 
anxious to assume. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for an Order of the Court 
rescinding the Decree of Adoption. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
37. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this 
reference as if fully set forth herein all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 35. 
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38. In the event that the Court does not rescind the 
adoption, it would be in the best interests of the children that 
the Court restore to the Plaintiff and provide formally and by 
way of order for the Plaintiff's visitation rights with Trevor 
and Baron. 
39. The Plaintiff's visitation rights should correspond to 
the rights provided for in the Decree of Divorce referred to 
above, except as may have been modified by the parties' practice, 
if at all, since the granting of the Decree of Divorce. 
WHEREFORE, in the alternative, the Plaintiff prays for 
visitation rights with the minor children, Trevor and Baron, 
consistent with the visitation privileges set forth in the 
Divorce Decree between the Plaintiff and Defendant, Catherine J. 
Wheeler. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Specific Performance and Breach of Contract 
40. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this 
reference as if fully set forth herein all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 40. 
41. The parties agreed for ongoing visitation in 
consideration of the adoption. The Defendants have breached the 
agreement by unilaterally terminating the contractual visitation 
rights of the Plaintiff. 
42. The only adequate remedy available at law is that of 
specific performance. 
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43. The Defendants should be ordered, per the contract of 
the parties, to facilitate and permit ongoing contact and 
visitation. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for an order of the court 
ordering the specific performance of the parties' contract to 
permit the ongoing visitation and contact between the Plaintiff 
and the minor children. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant, and each of them, as follows: 
1. That the Decree of Adoption be rescinded and set aside. 
2. That the Plaintiff be restored his parental rights and 
obligations. 
3. That in the alternative the Plaintiff be restored 
visitation rights pursuant to the parties1 agreement and the 
equitable powers of the Court which visitation rights would be in 
the best interest of the children. 
4. That the Court enter an order for the specific 
performance of the parties1 contract to permit the ongoing 
visitation and contact between the Plaintiff and the minor 
children. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
proper. 
DATED THIS £& day of April, 1997. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GREEN. & BERRY 
/1 7 
r&&/A 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C:\WPDATA\FNG\G-2l 5-97VAMCOMPLA PLD 9 
DATED THIS Z% day of March, 1997 
"GENTRY G 
Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss 
) 
Gentry Gamble, the Plaintiff in the foregoing being first 
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: that he has read the 
foregoing, knows the contents thereof, that the matters therein 
are true and correct and based upon information and belief, and 






SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
1997, 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
- ^ I 
^SBfm- l SaftlifaftCfty,Utofr<ni 1 
My Convnitaion E»fej 
Septombtr 26, i W7 
•T"-" State of Utah i 
944 Hyland Lake Dr ive 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121 
rary "PiiBlic 
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake County 
S t a t e of Utah 
C \WPDATA\FNG\G-215-97UMCOMPLA.PLD 10 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration,, the attached 
AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT upon the following parties by causing 
to be hand delivered a true and correct copy thereof to: 
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq. 
Winder & Haslam 
Attorneys for Defendants 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
on the 28 day of April, 1997. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 day of April, 
1997. 
C \WPDATA\FNG\G-215-97\AMCOMPLA PLD 11 
TabD 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0) 
GREEN Sc BERRY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
62 2 Newhouse Building, 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
GENTRY GAMBLE AFFIDAVIT OF GENTRY GAMBLE, 
DATED APRIL 28, 1997 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL R. LARSEN AND 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gentry Gamble, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I am the Plaintiff above named and have filed a 
Verified Complaint. 
2. This Affidavit will supplement and augment the Verified 
Complaint as follows. 
3. Since the adoption of Trevor and Baron by Daniel R. 
Larsen, my relationship with Trevor and Baron has not changed. 
They still look to me as their father. 
4. Our visitation has continued just as it did prior to 
the adoption. 
Civil NO. 970901796 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
5. The children visit with me on Father's Day. We 
vacation together. I attend their extracurricular activities and 
school functions just as I did before. We communicate in writing 
as we always have. 
6. The refusal of the Defendants to permit any contact 
between the children and myself was abrupt and distressing to me. 
7. Based upon my intimate relationship with the boys, I am 
sure that it is equally distressing for them. 
8. This behavior of the Defendants is consistent with the 
abusive behavior that was reported to me, and others, regarding 
the Defendants and how they "discipline" and limit the reasonable 
activities of the children. 
9. Attached hereto and marked Exhibits "A" through " fV " 
are photographs taken since the adoption, as well as 
correspondence, cards, and the like that I have received from the 
children, since the adoption. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Q ^ day of April, 
AU/REfe * p f ^ ^ ! 
Sta» of Utaft J 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the attached 
AFFIDAVIT OF GENTRY GAMBLE, DATED APRIL 28, 1997 upon the 
following parties by causing to be hand delivered a true and 
correct copy thereof to: 
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq. 
Winder & Haslam 
Attorneys for Defendants 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
on the 28 day of April, 1997. 
, h fi , / 1 ~*Q=£ 
-x-SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 day of April, 
1997 . 
N(^ t^ 6y Publl 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 



























































Created just for you 
Baron and Trevor 
8774B 
m^ ^ Rrmted On Recycled Paper 
^ L J 30% Pre Consumer • 20% Post Consumer 
AMERICAN V # CR£E 1INGS QeataCard' 
••SflMtanj xoro <P>AGC inc 
Clpvehnd Ohm 44144 
HEY, 
DADDY, 
LET'S DO IT AGAIN! 
Yours Truly, 
Baron and Trevor 
J 
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IF YOU SEE THIS PERSON IN 
OR NEAR THE WAGONMASTER 
RESTAURANT IN SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
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GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JIJVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of AMENDED PETITION FOR 
TERMINATION 
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE, and OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE. 
Case NO. 933163, 933164 
Persons under the age 
of eighteen (18) years. Judge Kimberly K. Hornak 
Gentry Gamble, Petitioner herein, petitions the Court for 
termination of parental rights and alleges in support thereof as 
follows: 
1. Gentry Gamble resides at 944 Hyland Lake Drive, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble is a male child, born February 10, 
1987; and, Baron G. Wheeler Gamble is a male child, born July 24, 
1985-
3. Both children were born in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Both children reside with Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J. Wheeler 
at 3796 East Thousand Oaks Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. The Petitioner is the natural father of the minor children 
who has earlier consented to their adoption by Daniel R. Larsen and 
executed a consent for adoption for that adoption. The consent for 
adoption was given in partial consideration of the promise of Daniel 
vr>Kfo-2\yrT^uDiTrauu> 
R. Larsen and Catherine J. Wheeler for continued and reasonable 
visitation between the Petitioner and the minor children which has 
continued up until January, 1997. 
5. The Petitioner has maintained with the children and they 
have reciprocated, the bond and relationship of parent and child. 
6. The pertinent information regarding the interested parties 
is as follows: 
Name Address Date of Birth 
Gentry Gamble 944 Hyland Lake Drive 09-19-57 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Catherine J. Wheeler 3796 E. Thousand Oaks Circle 10-25-59 
Salt Lake City, UT 84118 
Daniel R. Larsen 3796 E. Thousand Oaks Circle 09-18-58 
Salt Lake City, UT 84118 
7. At the present time, Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J. 
Wheeler have custody of the minor children. 
8. The children have each reported to the Petitioner that they 
have been physically abused by Wheeler and Larsen. Furthermore, on 
information and belief the same report has been made by the children 
to administrators or teachers at their school. Based thereon, and 
on information and belief, Larsen and Wheeler have neglected or 
abused the children which behavior renders them unfit or incompetent 
pursuant to §78-3a-407, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
9. According to the report of the children, the abuse of the 
petitioners has taken the following forms: 
a. repeated hitting and striking with a man's leather 
belt; 
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b. requiring that the children chose the belt. Should the 
child or children flinch, cry out or resist these beatings, then they 
are punished with additional "strappings" with the belt; 
c. striking and hitting with an open hand and the back 
of the hand; 
d. confinement in closed areas such as the bathroom, a 
particular spot on a tile floor, or the family dog kennel, without 
a pillow or blanket, to sleep on a rock/dirt floor. 
e. withholding food for up to a day at a time; 
f. demeaning and injurious verbal abuse disparaging the 
children's intellectual capacity and general intelligence; 
g. being punched in the stomach and elsewhere on the 
body ; 
h. hitting each child with a frying pan, on one occasion 
with a cooler in the head. 
10. On one occasion, Baron has been forced to call 911 to 
report what he believed to be an emergency related to abuse similar 
to that set forth above. 
11. Typically, the above behavior is inflicted on the children 
in a response to less than perfect performance of homework or other 
school assignments, or minor infractions such as leaving a ball-point 
pen on the floor to be picked up by one of the Respondents. 
12. The nature of this abuse consisting of its frequency and 
lack of reasonable "justification" or explanation by the Respondents, 
is sufficient to warrant the termination of parental rights. 
13. These incidents have been reported to the Division of 
Family Services or Division of Human Services of the State of Utah, 
3 
and an investigation has been conducted. Despite the Petitioner's 
request, that investigation has not been subject to review. On 
information and belief, Daniel R. Larsen has represented to others, 
including Baron's school principal or administrator, as well as 
investigators and police officers, that he is the assistant attorney 
general in charge of the Division of Family Service, or otherwise 
occupies some position of authority or power in connection with the 
Division of Family Services. The Petitioner is reasonably 
apprehensive that the investigation, if any, has been limited or 
curtailed because of the representations of Mr. Larsen. 
14. It would be reasonable and in the best interests of the 
children that their custody or guardianship be awarded to the 
Petitioner. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays that the Court enter an Order 
terminating the parental rights of Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J. 
Wheeler as to the minor children set forth above, and that custody 
or guardianship of the children be awarded to the Petitioner together 
with such further and additional relief as the Court may deem proper. 
DATED THIS 7 day of July, 1997. 
GREEN & BERRY 
Petitioner's Address: 
944 Hyland Lake Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
vrnoc-215-rAAMDrrrn nx> 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING AND DELIVERY BY FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing AMENDED PETITION FOR TERMINATION 
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS was faxed to the office of William W. Downes, 
Jr. , at 532-3706 and was placed in the United States mail at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on 
the <Y day of July, 1997, addressed as follows: 
iflaJy)on 10^ William w. Downes, Jr 
WINDER & HASLEM 
175 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
E*FWOO-2IJ-»7VAMDreTTlfLD 
TabF 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




DANIEL R. LARSEN and 
CATHERINE J. WHEELER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil NO, 970901796 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff and Appellant 
Gentry Gamble, by and through his attorney of record, Frederick 
N. Green of Green & Berry, appeals to the Court of Appeals the 
final Order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian entered in this matter 
on June 27, 1997, which is an Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss. 
DATED THIS day of July, 1997. 
GREEN 
^RfeDERti2K N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
E \FNG\G-215-97\NOTAPPEA.PLD 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audi BH-—L> > AO icee ,* being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the attached NOTICE 
OF APPEAL to the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq. 
Winder & Haslam 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appelees 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
*L day of 1997, 
»g//ff<L/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thi of June, 
1997. 
rary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 
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78-3a-104 JUDICIAL CODE 30 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS broken bones of subject child's siblings and 
evidence showed that the father was unable to 
After-born child protect the children and the serious abuse of 
Prima facie case subject child's siblings occurred only ten 
Protection of children
 m o n t h s b e f o r e h i g b i r t h R R y g ^ 2 g 6 U t a h 
After-born child. A d v - R e P 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Former § 78-3a-2(16)(a)(iv), granting courts 
jurisdiction to determine if a child was abused Protection of children. 
or neglected, could apply to a child conceived Guardian mother had a good faith basis that 
and born after another child in the home was was objectively reasonable for believing in the 
abused or neglected K.K. v State, 286 Utah need to consent on behalf of her minor children 
Adv Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) to the taping of telephone conversations with 
her estranged husband in order to fulfill her 
statutory mandate under former § 78-3a-2 to Prima facie case. Evidence was sufficient to establish the ele-
r r r , i act m the best interests of the children. Thomp-ments ot a prima facie case ot neglect under ^ ,
 OOQ ^ c 1 C O c fr\ TT± U r x 7o o o,- ,™ w ^ u ii * J s o n v Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Utah 
former § 78-3a-2(16)(d)(iv) where appellant ad- iqqo\ 
mitted that she caused the skull fractures and 
78-3a-104. Jurisdiction of juvenile court — Original — 
Exclusive. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a minor who has violated any federal, state, or local law or 
municipal ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has 
violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless 
of where the violation occurred, excluding traffic laws and ordinances; 
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or refused to comply 
with an order of the juvenile court to pay a fine or restitution, if the order 
was imposed prior to the person's 21st birthday; however, the continuing 
jurisdiction is limited to causing compliance with existing orders; 
(c) a minor who is abused, neglected, or dependent, as those terms are 
defined in Section 78-3a-103; 
(d) the determination of the custody of a minor or to appoint a guardian 
of the person or other guardian of a minor who comes within the court's 
jurisdiction under other provisions of this section; 
(e) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance 
with Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, including termination of 
residual parental rights and duties; 
(f) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor; 
(g) a minor who, in defiance of earnest and persistent efforts on the part 
of his parents and school authorities as required under Section 53A-11-
103, is a habitual truant from school; 
(h) the judicial consent to the marriage of a minor under age 16 upon a 
determination of voluntariness or where otherwise required by law, 
employment, or enlistment of a minor when consent is required by law; 
(i) any parent or parents of a minor committed to a secure youth 
corrections facility, to order, at the discretion of the court and on the 
recommendation of a secure youth corrections facility, the parent or 
parents of a minor committed to a secure youth corrections facility for a 
custodial term, to undergo group rehabilitation therapy under the direc-
tion of a secure youth corrections facility therapist, who has supervision of 
that parent's or parents' minor, or any other therapist the court may 
31 JUVENILE COURTS 78-3a-104 
direct, for a period directed by the court as recommended by a secure youth 
corrections facility; 
(j) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate Compact on Juve-
niles; 
(k) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. The court may 
commit a child to the physical custody of a local mental health authority 
or to the legal custody of the Division of Mental Health in accordance with 
the procedures and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 12, Part 2A. The 
court may not commit a child directly to the Utah State Hospital; and 
(1) the commitment of a minor in accordance with Section 62A-8-501. 
(2) In addition to the provisions of Subsection (l)(a) the juvenile court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over any traffic offense committed by a minor under 16 
years of age and concurrent jurisdiction over the following traffic offenses 
committed by a minor 16 years of age or older: 
(a) Section 76-5-207, automobile homicide; 
(b) Section 41-6-44, operating a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs; 
(c) Section 41-6-45, reckless driving; 
(d) Section 41-la-1311, unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer; 
(e) Section 41-la-1314, unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer for an extended period of time; and 
(f) Section 41-6-13.5, fleeing a peace officer. 
(3) The court also has jurisdiction over traffic offenses that are part of a 
single criminal episode filed in a petition that contains an offense over which 
the court has jurisdiction. 
(4) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over questions of custody, support, 
and visitation certified to it by the district court. 
(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable or runaway 
minor who is referred to it by the Division of Child and Family Services or by 
public or private agencies that contract with the division to provide services to 
that minor where, despite earnest and persistent efforts by the division or 
agency, the minor has demonstrated that he: 
(a) is beyond the control of his parent, guardian, lawful custodian, or 
school authorities to the extent that his behavior or condition endangers 
his own welfare or the welfare of others; or 
(b) has run away from home. 
(6) This section does not restrict the right of access to the juvenile court by 
private agencies or other persons. 
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of all magistrate functions relative to 
cases arising under Section 78-3a-602. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-104, enacted by L. 
1996, ch. 1, § 27; 1996, ch. 234, § 15; 1996, 
ch. 318, § 36. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 234, effective April 29, 1996, added 
Subsections (l)(k) and (1)(1), making a related 
stylistic change, and in Subsection (l)(f) de-
leted "mentally ill or" before "mentally retarded 
minor" and "who comes within the court's juris-
diction under other provisions of this section" 
after "mentally retard minor." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 318, effective 
April 29, 1996, inserted "Child and" in Subsec-
tion (5). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 
makes the act effective on January 31, 1996. 
78-3a-105 JUDICIAL CODE 3? 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction with other law. jurisdiction to juvenile courts in termination 
A proceeding involving the termination of a proceedings, provides a specific statutory 
parent's rights and obligations is not a custody framework to follow in termination proceed-
proceedmg under the Utah Uniform Child Cus- mgs, and these specific statutory provisions 
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), § 78-45c-l et prevail over the more general provisions of the 
seq , Utah's Termination of Parental Rights Utah UCCJA, which makes no specific refer-
Act, § 78-3a-402 et seq , in conjunction with ence to termination proceedings. T.B. v. M.M.J., 
statutory provisions granting exclusive original 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App. 19^5). 
78-3a-105. Concurrent jurisdiction. 
(1) The district court or other court exercising jurisdiction over a violation 
has concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court: 
(a) when a person 18 years of age or older who is under the continuing 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section 78-3a-516 violates any 
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance; 
(b) in adoption proceedings where the court has previously entered an 
order terminating the rights of a parent and the court finds that adoption 
is in the best interests of the minor. Adoption proceedings under .this 
section follow the procedure in Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption. 
(2) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over petitions to modify a minor's 
birth certificate if the court otherwise has jurisdiction over the minor. 
(3) (a) This section does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to 
appoint a guardian for a minor, or to determine the support, custody, and 
visitation of a minor upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of 
support, custody, and visitation is incidental to the determination of a 
cause in the district court. 
(b; However, if a petition involving the same minor is pending in the 
juvenile court or the juvenile court has previously acquired continuing 
jurisdiction over the same minor, the district court may certify the 
question of support, custody, and visitation to the juvenile court for 
determination. 
(4) A district court may at any time decline to pass upon a question of 
support, custody, and visitation and may certify those questions to the juvenile 
court. 
(5) When a question is certified to the juvenile court under Subsection (3) or 
(4), the findings and order of the juvenile court judge are the order of the 
district court. 
(6) (a) Where a support, custody, or visitation award has been made in a 
district court in a divorce action or other proceeding and the jurisdiction of 
the district court in the case is continuing, the juvenile court may acquire 
jurisdiction in a case involving the same minor if the minor is dependent, 
abused, or neglected or otherwise comes within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104. 
(b) The juvenile court may by order change the custody, support, and 
visitation rights previously ordered in the district court as necessary to 
implement the order of the juvenile court for the safety and welfare of the 
minor. The juvenile court order remains in effect so long as the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court continues. 
(7) Upon the filing of a copy of the findings and order of the juvenile court 
with the district court, the findings and order of the juvenile court are binding 
on the parties to the divorce action as though entered in the district court. 
TabH 
ADOPTION 78-30-2 
Foster parents' agreement that they will not Marital or sexual relationship between par-
attempt to adopt foster child, validity and en- ties as affecting right to adopt, 42 A L R 4th 
forcement, 78 A L R 3d 770 776 
Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor Parties required in adoption proceedings, 48 
in adoption proceedings, 84 A L R 3d 665 A L R 4th 860 
Equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel,
 A c t l 0 n for wrongful adoption based on mis-
94 A L R 3 d 347 representation of child's mental or physical 
U T \ r Spa,tUi! ° f .P r 0 B P e c t l v e p a r e n t s a s f a c" condition or parentage, 56 A L R 4th 375 
tor, 2 A LK 4th 555
 W h o i g « s t e p c h l l d » for purpose8 0f 
Criminal liability of one arranging for adop-
 § 1 0 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) o f I m m l g r a t l o n a J Nationality 
S e i r ^ ^ ^ ^(SUSCS , U0lS(l)(B)),54ALR Fe/ 
A L R 4 t h 468 l** 
Standing of foster parent to seek termination When is illegitimate child legitimated for 
of rights of foster child's natural parents, 21 Purposes of § 101(b)(1)(C) of Immigration and 
A L R 4 t h 535 Nationality Act (8 U S C S § 1101(bXD(C)), 
Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34 63 A L R Fed 520 
A L R 4th 167 Key Numbers. — Adoption «=> 4, 5 
78-30-1.1, Licensed child placing agency — Defined. 
As used m this chapter the term "licensed child placing agency" means an 
agency licensed to place children for adoption under Title 62A, Chapter 4, 
Part 2 
History: C. 1953, 78-30-1.1, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 245, § 3. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch 245 be-
78-30-1.5. Legislative intent. 
It is the intent and desire of the Legislature that m every adoption the best 
interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court's 
determination 
History: C. 1953, 78-30-1 5, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 245, § 4. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch 245 be-
78-30-2. Relative ages. 
A person adopting a child must be at least ten years older than the child 
adopted, unless the petitioners for adoption are a married couple, one of which 
is at least ten years older than the child. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C L. 1907, § 2; C.L. 
1917, § 11; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 14-4-2; L. 
1985, ch. 20, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Comment, The Utah Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am Jur 2d Adoption 
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitu § 10 
tion, 1986 Utah L Rev 319 C.J.S. — 2 C J S Adoption of Persons ^ 13 
Key Numbers. — Adoption <&* 4 
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Tab I 
1037 OPERATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-903 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- the statement of the rule and substituted 
ment deleted provisions relating to circuit "prosecuting attorney" for "county attorney" in 
courts from the applicability paragraph and Subdivisions (1)(A), (2)(A), and (2)(C) 
Rule 4-902. Certification of district court cases to juvenile 
court. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the district court to certify questions of support, 
custody or visitation to the juvenile court. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In district court cases where there is a question concerning the support, 
custody or visitation of a child and a petition concerning abuse, dependency, 
or neglect of the same child has been filed in juvenile court, the district court 
shall certify the question of support, custody or visitation to the juvenile court 
for determination. 
(2) In other district court cases involving questions of support, custody or 
visitation, the district court, for good cause shown, upon its own motion or the 
motion of either party may certify the question of support, custody or visita-
tion to the juvenile court for determination. 
(3) A district court order certifying questions of support, custody or visita-
tion of a child shall state whether the question is certified pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-3a-105(3) or 78-3a-105(4) When a case is certified pur-
suant to Section 78-3a-105(4), the certification order shall state the reason or 
reasons for certification and the question or questions to be determined by the 
juvenile court. 
(4) When the district court certifies questions of support, custody or visita-
tion, the clerk of the district court shall transmit the entire case file to the 
clerk of the juvenile court who shall refer it to the presiding judge for assign-
ment. 
(5) When the question or questions certified to the juvenile court have been 
determined by the juvenile court and the appropriate order entered, the clerk 
of the juvenile court shall transmit the file to the clerk of the district court, 
who shall refer it back to the judge assigned to handle the matter. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment corrected statutory references in Subdivi-
sion (3) 
Rule 4-903. Uniform custody evaluations. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform guidelines for the preparation of custody evaluations. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Custody evaluations shall be performed by persons with the following 
minimum qualifications: 
(A) Social work evaluations shall be performed by social workers li-
censed by the state in which they practice. 
Tab J 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 182 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel 
—Lack of due process 
—Merits of case 
—Mistake or inadvertence 
—Mutual mistake 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof 
—Divorce action 
Independent action 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished , 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 






Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
